Secure Data Transmission in Cooperative Modes: Relay and MAC by Ghanem, Samah A. M. & Ara, Munnujahan
ar
X
iv
:1
40
5.
35
07
v1
  [
cs
.IT
]  
14
 M
ay
 20
14
1
Secure Data Transmission in Cooperative Modes:
Relay and MAC
Samah A. M. Ghanem∗, Munnujahan Ara†,
∗Mobile Communications Department,
Eurecom Institute, Campus SophiaTech, 06410 Biot, France
Email: samah.ghanem@eurecom.fr;
†Mathematics Department,
Khulna University, Khulna-9208, Bangladesh
Email: munnujahan@gmail.com
Abstract—Cooperation in clouds provides a promising tech-
nique for 5G wireless networks, supporting higher data rates.
Security of data transmission over wireless clouds could put
constraints on devices; whether to cooperate or not. Therefore,
our aim is to provide analytical framework for the security on
the physical layer of such setup and to define the constraints
embodied with cooperation in small size wireless clouds. In this
paper, two legitimate transmitters Alice and John cooperate to
increase the reliable transmission rate received by their common
legitimate receiver Bob, where one eavesdropper, Eve exists.
We provide the achievable secure data transmission rates with
cooperative relaying and when no cooperation exists creating a
Multiple Access Channel (MAC). The paper considers the analy-
sis of different cooperative scenarios: a cooperative scenario with
two relaying devices, a cooperative scenario without relaying, a
non-cooperative scenario, and cooperation from one side. We
derive analytical expressions for the optimal power allocation
that maximizes the achievable secrecy rates for the different set of
scenarios where the implication of cooperation on the achievable
secrecy rates was analyzed. We propose a distributed algorithm
that allows the devices to select whether to cooperate or not and
to choose their optimal power allocation based on the cooperation
framework selected. Moreover, we defined distance constraints to
enforce the benefits of cooperation between devices in a wireless
cloud.
Index Terms—Achievable secrecy rate, Cooperation, MAC,
Relaying.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Wiretap channel models scenarios of the data transmis-
sion under security attacks on the physical layer [1]. This paper
focuses on the physical layer security in a wiretap channel
model of interest; including two legitimate transmitters that are
relay devices, one legitimate receiver, and one eavesdropper.
Several optimal power allocation interpretations that aim to
maximize the secure and reliable information rates are ex-
isting in the literature. Such designs were done for different
channel models, for example, for the two user MAC Gaussian
channel [2], or for cooperative virtual MIMOs [3] by directly
maximizing the mutual information, or via optimizing other
design criterion such as, minimizing the mean square error [4],
or minimizing the bit error rate [5]. In [6], the authors address
secure communications of one source-destination pair with the
help of multiple cooperating relays in the presence of one
or more eavesdroppers with different cooperative schemes.
In [7], the authors provide upper bounds of the achievable
rates of a discrete memoryless MAC channel with confidential
messages are to be transmitted in perfect secrecy. In [8], the
authors devise several cooperation strategies and characterize
the corresponding achievable rate-equivocation region. They
consider a deaf helper phenomenon, where the relay is able to
facilitate secure communications while being totally ignorant
of the transmitted messages. In [9], the author studied the
security of communication for the relay channel under the
situation that some of the transmitted messages are confiden-
tial to the relay. Moreover, in [10], the authors considered
cooperative jamming where a relay equipped with multiple
antennas transmits a jamming signal to create interference at
the eavesdropper. They proposed design methods to determine
the antenna weights and transmit power of source and relay,
so that the system secrecy rate is maximized.
In this paper, we consider a scenario which is more of
practical relevance where two side cooperation exists. The
usual assumption of one side cooperation is addressed for
analytical purposes only. However, we consider cooperation of
bi-directional two relay devices to show that ’a real egoistic
behavior is to cooperate’, [11]. Our work differs from other
works not only on this assumption, but we have also consid-
ered that the devices under certain distance constraints switch
their mode of cooperation from Relay to MAC or vice versa
or choose not to cooperate. This assumption is of particular
relevance in a device to device cooperation within a wireless
cloud to assure that cooperation will not harm one or the other
device reliable and secure transmission rates.
Recently, another branch in the field of physical layer
security relied on game theory. The maximization of reli-
able information rates with different channel models with
cooperative relaying and with the existence of a jammer are
considered in [12]. Optimal power allocation strategies were
derived for a zero sum game with an unfriendly jammer
in [13]. In [14], the authors studied the achievable secrecy rates
for a non-cooperative zero sum game with a jamming relay
2assisting the eavesdropper. They found a saddle point solution
of such game. In [15], the authors propose a distributed
game-theoretic method for power allocation in bi-directional
cooperative communication. They showed that their method
reaches equilibrium in one stage, and proved the benifits of
bi-directional cooperation between nodes closer to each other.
In [16], the authors address the power allocation problem
for interference relay channels. They model the problem as
a strategic non-cooperative game and show that this game
always has a unique Nash equilibrium. In [17], the authors
investigate the interaction between the source and friendly
jammers, they introduce a game theoretic approach in order
to obtain a distributed solution. Moreover, in [18], the authors
investigate optimal power allocation strategies for OFDM
wiretap channels with the existence of friendly jammers.
In this paper, the wiretap channel model of interest has no
jammers, however, bi-directional cooperative communication
between relay devices are considered. Here, we are particularly
concerned about optimal cooperative power allocation strate-
gies which allow maximum reliable and achievable secrecy
rates. Despite the fact that our problem can be formulated
using game theory. However, the focus here is much more in
finding strategies in a distributed sense which can allow the
devices to choose first their cooperation mode, then to allocate
their power control strategy accordingly.
The broadcast nature of a wireless medium allows multiple
devices to transmit and receive simultaneously. Such nature,
allows some devices to choose to cooperate in fixed or mobile
clouds for their shared benefits, or to overhear and target
multiple transmitting devices through their direct transmission,
or over their relayed transmission. In this paper, we focus on
a similar setup, where transmitting devices cooperate, while
an eavesdropper overhear their own transmissions, assuming
that this eavesdropper is only overhearing their own direct
transmissions. In fact, this assumption is basically based on the
lack of knowledge of the eavesdropper - who aims to decode
their transmitted messages - that a message of one transmitter
could be mixed over time or that any cooperation could exist.
This assumption could also simplify the mathematical setup
of the problem. Of particular relevance are the benefits of
cooperation to secure data transmission, and more relevant is
to study when and where cooperation should exist, building a
framework of distance constraints which could allow devices
in a cloud to decide to go for cooperation, to cooperate from
one side, not to cooperate, or to change location avoiding any
distance attacks. We mean by a distance attack, is the capabil-
ity of one eavesdropper device to experience a better version of
the transmitted message than the legitimate receiving device.
Under such distance constraints, the legitimate transmitters and
receivers could choose to move far from an attacking device
as a defense strategy.
In this paper, we build a framework for the achievable
secrecy rates - defined by upper bounds for relay devices
- capitalizing on the achievable rates for MAC channels.
Then we derive the optimal power allocation strategies under
different scenarios, where two legitimate transmitters/receivers
Alice and John cooperate in a bi-directional way to increase
their secrecy rate, i.e., to increase the secure and reliable
information transmission rate received by Bob, their common
legitimate receiver during which an eavesdropper, Eve tries
to eavesdrop both. Four scenarios have been analyzed, a
cooperative scenario where relaying is used between Alice
and John, cooperation without relaying, a non-cooperative
scenario, and a scenario with cooperation from one side.
In the four scenarios, the optimal power allocation for both
legitimate transmitters has been derived to maximize their
secure achievable rates against Eve. The solution set is the
optimal response from Alice and John. We finally consider
the distance of Eve as the limiting constraint that defines how
much the cooperation will be of benefit.
The paper is organized as follows, section II explains
the model used throughout the paper, section III introduces
the model achievable secrecy rate regions. In section IV,
the scenarios, the implications on their achievable secrecy
rates, the formulation of the optimization problem, and the
optimal power allocation are introduced. Section V builds
upon distance constraints for the model under study. Section
VI presents the proposed algorithm, and we conclude the paper
with numerical and analytical results.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a model that includes two legitimate transmit-
ters Alice and John, and one common legitimate receiver, Bob.
One eavesdropper Eve tries to decrease the security of both
transmitters trying to decode the messages received by both
transmitters. The communications between different parties
are done over a point to point bi-directional links. Figure 1
illustrates the system model1.
The transmitted message from transmitter i is defined as
xi, and the received message by the receiver k is defined as
yk. Considering that Alice and John are relay devices who
cooperate in relaying each others data to Bob who receives
two vectors from Alice and from John, assuming that each
will relay a replica of the other’s main message as follows,
yab = Gab
√
Paxa +Gab
√
Pabxj + n1. (1)
yjb = Gjb
√
Pjxj +Gjb
√
Pjbxa + n2. (2)
However, Eve receives two vectors from Alice and John;
assuming that Eve will receive the main message of each via
overhearing, and will not be aware of the relayed part, this
assumption is done for the sake of simplicity, as follows,
yae = Gae
√
Paxa + n¯1. (3)
yje = Gje
√
Pjxj + n¯2. (4)
yab ∈ Cn and yjb ∈ Cn represent the received vectors
of complex symbols at Bob’s side from Alice and John;
1Notice that the model considers that the power PA, PJ for Alice and
John, respectively is divided between the main transmitted signals and the
relayed ones.
3Figure 1. The system model.
respectively, yae ∈ Cn and yje ∈ Cn represent the received
vectors of complex symbols at Eve’s side from Alice and
John; respectively. xa ∈ Cn and xj ∈ Cn represent the
vectors of complex transmit symbols with zero mean and
identity covariance E[xax†a],E[xjx
†
j ], respectively. n1 ∈ Cn,
n2 ∈ Cn, n¯1 ∈ Cn, and n¯2 ∈ Cn represent vectors of
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian noises with zero mean
and identity covariance. Gik represent the complex gains2
of the channels between transmitter i and receiver k.
√
Pjb
and
√
Pab represent the relay power used by John and Alice
respectively to relay each others data.
√
Pa and
√
Pj represent
the transmitted power for Alice and John used respectively to
transmit their own data.
If relaying is precluded, the second sum term including√
Pjb and
√
Pab will be omitted from the equations. The
achievable secrecy rate that each of the legitimate devices
will try to maximize is called (Cs), assuming Maximum Ratio
Combiner (MRC) at Bob’s side.
III. THE SECURE ACHIEVABLE RATE REGIONS
A. Achievability Framework
We can consider that the achievable secrecy rate regions
for the model in Figure 1 with two relay devices and one
eavesdropper coincide with that of the MAC with one common
eavesdropper, see [7], [19], [20]. Therefore, we can conclude
the following theorem.
Theorem 1: (Achievability): The achievable secure rate re-
gions for the model in Figure 1 is upper bounded by the
2Notice that the channel gains are considered to be fixed over the trans-
mission time of each symbol (xa, xj). This means that the transmission
time is contained in the interval of the coherence time of the channel
between each legitimate transmitter and the legitimate receiver. Therefore,
Gab(
√
Paxa +
√
Pabxj) and Gjb(
√
Pjbxa +
√
Pjxj) are associated to
the transmission of the main and relayed transmitted symbols over each link.
”secure” achievable rates for a MAC channel corresponding
to each transmitter and their common receiver, and the two
legitimate transmitters and their common eavesdropper. The
rates in the closure of the union of all (R1, R2) satisfy,
R1 ≤ I(xa;Yb|xj)− I(xa;Ye|xj). (5)
R2 ≤ I(xj ;Yb|xa)− I(xj ;Ye|xa). (6)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(xa, xj ;Yb)− I(xa, xj ;Ye). (7)
Proof: We can re-write the rate regions considering some
auxiliary random variables U , V , and a time sharing variable
Q.
R1 ≤ I(xa;Yb|xj , Q)− I(xa;Ye|xj , Q). (8)
R2 ≤ I(V, xj ;Yb|U, xa, Q)− I(V, xj ;Ye|U, xa, Q). (9)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(xa, xj , U, V ;Yb|Q)− I(xa, xj , U, V ;Ye|Q).
(10)
For some product distribution U → V →
(Xa, Xj) → yab, yjb → Yb, yae, yje → Ye. The joint
probability distributions p(u, v, xa, xj , yab, yjb) factors as,
p(u)p(xa|u)p(v)p(xj |v)p(yab), yjb|xa, xj and the joint
probability distributions p(u, v, xa, xj , yae, yje) factors
as, p(u)p(xa|u)p(v)p(xj |v)p(yae), p(yje|xa, xj); and
the time sharing variable Q and through Markovity,
U → V → (Xa, Xj)→ (Yb, Ye), the claim is proved.
B. Problem Formulation
The maximum achievable secrecy rate for Alice,
Cs1 = max Rajb −Rae (11)
subject to the power constraint,
Pj + Pjb ≤ PJ (12)
Therefore,
Pjb
∗ = arg max
ζPjb,Pab/ζ
Rajb −Rae, (13)
with Pj∗ = PJ − Pjb∗, and 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1
Rajb = log(1+SNRab+SNRajb), when John is relaying
Alice data. When no relaying is considered Rajb is the same
as,
Rab = I(xa; yab) = log(1 + SNRab). (14)
Rae = I(xa; yae) = log(1 + SNRae). (15)
The maximum achievable secrecy rate for John,
Cs2 = max Rjab −Rje (16)
subject to the power constraint,
Pa + Pab ≤ PA (17)
Therefore,
Pab
∗ = arg max
Pab/ζ,ζPjb
Rjab −Rje, (18)
4with Pa∗ = PA − Pab∗, and 0 ≤ ζ ≤ 1
Rjab = log(1+SNRjb+SNRjab), when Alice is relaying
John data. When no relaying is consideredRjab is the the same
as,
Rjb = I(xj ; yjb) = log(1 + SNRjb). (19)
Rje = I(xj ; yje) = log(1 + SNRje). (20)
Where SNRik is the received signal to noise ratio between
transmitter i and receiver k.
SNRik =
GikPi
σ2
(21)
Gik is the channel gain between different devices, and σ2
is the noise power, considered as fixed over all links.
Given that the framework will include bi-directional co-
operation, and including relaying with α cooperation level
between Alice and John. The received SNR via the path of
transmitter i, relay point r, and receiver k will be considered
as follows, [15]
SNRirk =
GirGrkPiPrk
σ2(GirPi +GrkP rk + σ2)
(22)
Therefore, we need to analyze a set of scenarios where we
can derive the optimal power allocation required to maximize
the achievable secrecy rates, and therefore to get insights on
the effect of cooperation and relaying on the secrecy rates.
In particular, we will devise the optimal power allocation set
(Pab
∗, Pjb
∗) used for relaying, and (Pa∗, Pj∗) used for main
data transmission. Where Pa∗ = PA−Pab∗, and Pj∗ = PJ −
Pjb
∗
.
IV. COOPERATION FRAMEWORK
The cooperation setup in this paper is between two parties
who cooperate to reach their optimum strategies in service
request way, such that the one who request the relay service
will follow a strategy of cooperation defined by the other de-
vice, where both devices at the end cooperate in relaying each
others data, or not, in different cooperation levels. In particular,
the mathematical formulation will show how cooperation is
induced into the convex optimization problems. Based on
the objective functions defined for each device, the devices
choose the optimal power allocation, that may correspond
to a cooperation decision when cooperation is of benefit or
to minimal cooperation in a multiple access channel (MAC)
mode, or no cooperation when there is no benefit expected.
Let’s consider the objective functions per cooperative de-
vice, Alice with Cs1, and John with Cs2. However, distance
considerations will be induced into the mathematical formula-
tion to evaluate when the cooperation will be of benefit; this
will be discussed later in section VIII in the paper.
V. COOPERATIVE RELAYS
Within the different scenarios considered, Eve is trying to
eavesdrop both Alice and John. First, we consider the scenario
when John is trying to relay Alice data with power Pjb and
Alice is trying to relay John data with power Pab using the
shared bi-directional link between them (see Figure 1). Both
relays utilize Amplify and Forward (AF) protocol for coopera-
tion. The cooperation level defines the main cooperation point
in the mathematical formulation of the optimization problem.
Second, we consider the scenario where there is cooperation
without relaying data. Third, we consider a scenario where no
cooperation exists. Fourth, we consider a scenario when there
is cooperation from one side and without relaying data. The
later two scenarios considered give insightful solutions through
which cooperation between devices in wireless clouds can be
evaluated from a secrecy perspective. The optimization of each
objective function is solved such that it is the solution of the
derivative of the Lagrangian and applying the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions [21]. In particular, the achievable
secrecy rate is maximized subject to fixed total power con-
straint for each transmitter. The solution of such optimization
problem is the optimal power allocation that each device will
admit.
A. Cooperative Scenario with Relaying
Consider the model in Figure 1. To define the problem from
a MAC setup perspective as introduced in Theorem 1. The
achievable rate regions will follow the regions in Theorem 1.
Therefore, the achievable secrecy rate and their corresponding
optimization problem can be written as follows,
Cs1αPjb = max
αPjb
log(1+SNRab+SNRjb)−log(1+SNRae).
(23)
Subject to,
Pj + Pjb ≤ PJ (24)
Cs2Pab
α
= max
Pab
α
log(1+SNRah+SNRjb)−log(1+SNRje).
(25)
Subject to,
Pa + Pab ≤ PA (26)
However, such setup introduces a maximization over the
upper bound of the achievable rates of the MAC at Bob
without the upper bound on the eavesdropper MAC channel
due to our previous assumptions. Therefore, this way the
problem is not well defined, and we don’t want to substitute
the whole received SNR from Alice to Bob, or from John
to Bob in both objective functions. Then, we will not be
exactly optimizing over the MAC upper bound, but we will be
optimizing over the relay capacity which induces the received
SNR over the relay bi-directional link between Alice and
Bob. It follows that, the achievable secrecy rate and their
corresponding optimization problem will be as follows,
Cs1αPjb = max
αPjb
log(1 + SNRab + SNRajb)− log(1 + SNRae)
(27)
Subject to,
Pj + Pjb ≤ PJ (28)
Cs2Pab
α
= max
Pab
α
log(1 + SNRjb + SNRjab)− log(1 + SNRje)
(29)
Subject to,
Pa + Pab ≤ PA (30)
5Since the one who is providing the service first dictates
the cooperation level, the formulation is defined as in (27)
and (29). Let Alice be the one who first request the relay
service from John. Therefore, the power John decides to
cooperate with will dictate the response of Alice. Hence, the
first objective (utility) Cs1 will lead to the optimal relay power
Pjb: John uses to relay Alice data so that he helps in increasing
her utility, i.e., increasing her achievable secrecy rate. On the
other hand, the second objective (utility) Cs2 is to maximize
John achievable secrecy rate by letting Alice relay the data of
John to Bob, thus we derive the optimal relay power Pab: Alice
uses to relay John data to Bob. λ is a constant corresponding
to the Lagrange multiplier. Thus, using the KKT conditions,
see [21], it follows an optimal power allocation policy. In
particular, the point of optimality is decided by John, such
that he optimizes his own objective, and because he wants to
offer cooperation, he decides the level of cooperation, called
α where, 0 ≤ α < 1. Assuming that John will be more
cooperative with Alice; the power cooperation is induced in
the optimization problem as follows,
Pab = αPjb (31)
Solving (27), the cooperative optimal power allocation for the
cooperative scenario through relaying which increases secrecy
rate for Alice is as follows,
ψ1Pjb
3 + ψ2Pjb
2 + ψ3Pjb + ψ4 = 0 (32)
where,
ψ1 = ω1α
2Gae; ψ2 = ω1ω4 + ω2α2Gae
ψ3 = ω2ω4 + ω3α
2Gae − αGajGjbGaePa(GajPa + σ2)
ψ4 = ω3ω4 − ω5GajGjbPa(GajPa + σ2)
ω1 = σ
2Gjb
2 +Gjb
2GabPa +Gjb
2GajPa
ω2 = (σ
2Gjb+2GjbGabPa+GajGjbPa+σ
2Gjb)(Gaj +σ
2)
ω3 = (GabPa + σ
2)(GajPa + σ
2)2
ω4 = ασ
2 + αGae(1 + λPa); ω5 = α2 +GaeλPa
P ∗jb is the solution of the third order equation, which is the
optimal power allocation John will decide to cooperate with
Alice to relay her data in order to increase her secrecy.
Solving (29), the cooperative optimal power allocation for
the cooperative scenario through relaying which increases
secrecy rate for John is as follows,
β1Pab
3 + β2Pab
2 + β3Pab + β4 = 0 (33)
where,
β1 = Gjeφ1; β2 = Gjeφ2 + φ1φ4
β3 = Gjeφ3 + φ2φ4 − αGjaGabGjePj(GajPj + σ
2)
β4 = φ3φ4 − φ5
φ1 = σ
2Gab
2 +Gab
2GjbPj +Gab
2GjaPj
φ2 = (σ
2Gab + 2GabGjbPj +GabGjaPj + σ
2Gab)(GjaPj + σ
2)
φ3 = (GjbPj + σ
2)(GjaPj + σ
2)2; φ4 = ασ2GjeλPj + αGje
φ5 = α
2σ2GjaGabGjeλP
2
j (GjaPj + σ
2)
P ∗ab is the solution of the third order equation, which is the
optimal power allocation Alice will use to cooperate with John
to relay his data in order to increase his secrecy. Therefore, the
optimal power allocation will be as provided in the following
Theorem.
Theorem 2: The optimal power allocation that maximizes
the achievable secrecy rate of the cooperative scenario with
relaying is the solution of (27) subject to (28) and (29)
subject to (30) identified with the optimal set (P ∗ab, P ∗jb)
in (32) and (33) respectively with Pab∗ = αPjb
VI. COOPERATIVE MAC
A. Cooperative Scenario without Relaying
This scenario will deal with the cooperative model in Figure
1 without the need to relay anyone’s data, so both will
cooperate in their own transmissions power to maximize the
secrecy rate of the other. Note that the achievable secrecy rate
region is still the same, however, this is a special case of the
one in the previous scenario, where the SNR that contributes
to the extra rates through relayed data will disappear from the
equation.
The achievable secrecy rates are defined as follows,
Cs1αPj = max
αPj
log(1 + SNRab)− log(1 + SNRae) (34)
Subject to,
Pj ≤ PJ (35)
Cs2Pa
α
= max
Pa
α
log(1 + SNRjb)− log(1 + SNRje) (36)
Subject to,
Pa ≤ PA (37)
Solving (34), the cooperative optimal P ∗j is the solution of
the quadratic equation,
λα2GabGaeP
2
j +λ(ασ
2Gab+ασ
2Gae)Pj−(σ2Gab−σ2Gae−λσ4) = 0
(38)
Solving (36), the cooperative optimal P ∗a is the solution of
the quadratic equation,
λGjeGjb
α2
P
2
a+λ(
σ2Gjb
α
+
σ2Gje
α
)Pa−(σ
2
Gjb−σ
2
Gje−λσ
4) = 0
(39)
Therefore, the optimal power allocation will be as provided in
the following Theorem.
Theorem 3: The optimal power allocation that maximizes
the achievable secrecy rates of the cooperative scenario with-
out relaying is the solution of (34) subject to (35) and (36)
subject to (37) identified with the optimal set (P ∗a , P ∗j ) given
by the following closed forms,
Pa
∗ = α2
√
λ2σ4(Gjb+Gje)
2+4λGjbGje(σ
2Gjb−σ
2Gje−λσ
4)
(λGjbGje)
2
−σ2( 1
Gje
+ 1
Gjb
) (40)
Pj
∗ = 12λα
√
(σ2Gab+σ
2Gae)2+4λGabGae(σ
2Gab−σ
2Gae−λσ4)
(GabGae)
2
−σ2( 1
Gae
+ 1
Gab
) (41)
Notice that the optimal cooperation level can be derived
finding out ∂Pj∂α or
∂Pa
∂α . On the other hand, we can derive also
the SNR over each link at which the cooperation is optimal.
6B. Cooperation from one side
This scenario will consider that John helps Alice, while
Alice does not help John. So, this scenario considers a cooper-
ation at which Alice and John are concerned to maximize her
own secrecy rate, since Eve is targeting Alice only. However,
no relaying is considered here.
This scenario is a special case of Theorem 1, where the up-
per bound for the achievable secrecy rate will be as mentioned
in the following Theorem.
Theorem 4: (Achievabilty): The achievable secure rate re-
gions for the model in Figure 1 with cooperation from one
side and without any relaying is upper bounded by the
secure achievable rates for a MAC channel corresponding to
each transmitter and their common receiver, and the channel
between Alice and the eavesdropper. The rates in the closure
of the union of all (R1, R2) satisfy,
R1 ≤ I(xa;Yb|xj)− I(xa;Ye). (42)
R2 ≤ I(xj ;Yb|xa). (43)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(xa, xj ;Yb)− I(xa;Ye). (44)
Proof: We can re-write the rate regions considering some
auxiliary random variables U´ , V´ , and a time sharing variable
Q´.
R1 ≤ I(xa;Yb|xj , Q´)− I(xa;Ye|Q´). (45)
R2 ≤ I(V´ , xj ;Yb|U´ , xa, Q´). (46)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(xa, xj , U´ , V´ ;Yb|Q´)− I(xa, U´ ;Ye|Q´). (47)
For some product distribution U´ → V´ →
(Xa, Xj) → yab, yjb → Yb, yae → Ye. The joint
probability distributions p(u´, v´, xa, xj , yab, yjb) factors
as, p(u´)p(xa|u´)p(v´)p(xj |v´)p(yab|xa)p(yjb|xj) and the
joint probability distribution p(u´, xa, yae) factors as,
p(u´pxa|u´)p(yae|xa); and the time sharing variable Q´ and
through Markovity, U´ → V´ → (Xa, Xj) → (Yb, Ye), the
claim is proved.
We define the optimization problem for the scenario of
cooperation from one side as follows,
Cs1Pa = max
Pa
log(1 + SNRab)− log(1 + SNRae) (48)
Subject to,
Pa ≤ PA (49)
Cs2αPj = max
αPj
log(1 + SNRab)− log(1 + SNRae) (50)
Subject to,
Pj ≤ PJ (51)
Such scenario will be a mixed scenario from the previous
scenario and the one in the next section. The optimal non-
cooperative P ∗a is the solution of the quadratic equation,
λGabGaeP
2
a+λ(σ
2
Gab+σ
2
Gae)Pa−(σ
2
Gab−σ
2
Gae−λσ
4) = 0
(52)
The optimal cooperative P ∗j is the solution of the quadratic
equation,
λα2GabGaeP
2
j +λ(ασ
2Gab+ασ
2Gae)Pj−(σ2Gab−σ2Gae−λσ4) = 0
(53)
Therefore, the optimal power allocation will be as provided in
the following Theorem.
Theorem 5: The optimal power allocation that maximizes
the achievable secrecy rates of the cooperative scenario from
one side is the solution of (48) subject to (49) and (50)
subject to (51) identified with the optimal set (P ∗a , P ∗j ) given
by the following closed forms,
Pa
∗
= 12
√
λ2σ4(Gab+Gae)
2+4λGabGae(σ
2Gab−σ
2Gae−λσ4)
(λGabGae)
2
−σ2( 1
Gae
+ 1
Gab
) (54)
Pj
∗ = 12λα
√
(σ2Gab+σ
2Gae)2+4λGabGae(σ
2Gab−σ
2Gae−λσ4)
(GabGae)
2
−σ2( 1
Gae
+ 1
Gab
) (55)
VII. NO-COOPERATION
In this scenario, no cooperation exists, thus every device
wants to maximize its own utility with its own resources.
The reasoning behind considering this scenario is to study
the implications of cooperation in the solution; i.e., to provide
analytical insight when the cooperation is of benefit.
We can first consider that the achievable secrecy rate regions
for the model in Figure 1 with two non-cooperative devices
and one eavesdropper coincide with that of the MAC with
one common eavesdropper. Therefore, we can conclude the
following Theorem.
Theorem 6: (Achievability): The achievable secure rate re-
gions for the model in Figure 1 is upper bounded by the
”secure” achievable rates for a MAC channel corresponding to
each non-cooperative transmitter and their common receiver,
and the two legitimate non-cooperative transmitters and their
common eavesdropper. The rates in the closure of the union
of all (R1, R2) satisfy,
R1 ≤ I(xa;Yb|xj)− I(xa;Ye|xj). (56)
R2 ≤ I(xj ;Yb|xa)− I(xj ;Ye|xa). (57)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(xa, xj ;Yb)− I(xa, xj ;Ye). (58)
Proof: The proof of this Theorem follows the steps in the
the proof of the Theorem 1.
It is of particular relevance to notice that the achievable
secrecy rates in Theorem 6 are only upper bounds to the rates
when the data are decoded from each transmitter. In fact, the
scenario of common receiver and common eavesdropper will
provide the chance for one legitimate transmitter or the other
to transmit securely and reliably or to leak data unevenly. To
clarify this point, we can provide the following example. Let
the achievable secrecy rate for Alice is as follows,
R1 ≤ I(xa;Yb|xj)− I(xa;Ye). (59)
7Then, based on the MAC channel rate regions defined by
common legitimate and illegitimate receivers. The achievable
rate for John will be as follows,
R2 ≤ I(xj ;Yb)− I(xj ;Ye|xa). (60)
Based on the chain rule of the mutual information defined as,
I(xi, xj ;Yj) = I(xi;Yj) + I(xj ;Yj |xi). (61)
The sum of the rate regions will be given as defined in the
Theorem, i.e.,
R1 +R2 ≤ I(xa, xj ;Yb)− I(xa, xj ;Ye). (62)
We define the optimization problem for the scenario of no
cooperation as follows,
Cs1Pa = max
Pa
log(1 + SNRab)− log(1 + SNRae) (63)
Subject to,
Pa ≤ PA (64)
Cs2Pj = max
Pj
log(1 + SNRjb)− log(1 + SNRje) (65)
Subject to,
Pj ≤ PJ (66)
Solving (63), the optimal non-cooperative P ∗a is the solution
of the quadratic equation,
λGabGaeP
2
a+λ(σ
2
Gab+σ
2
Gae)Pa−(σ
2
Gab−σ
2
Gae−λσ
4) = 0
(67)
Solving (65), the optimal non-cooperative P ∗j is the solution
of the quadratic equation,
λGjbGjeP
2
j +λ(σ
2
Gab+σ
2
Gje)Pj− (σ
2
Gjb−σ
2
Gje−λσ
4) = 0
(68)
Therefore, the optimal power allocation will be as provided
in the following Theorem.
Theorem 7: The optimal power allocation that maximizes
the achievable secrecy rates for the non-cooperative scenario
is the solution of (63) subject to (64) and (65) subject
to (66) identified with the optimal set (P ∗a , P ∗j ) given by the
following closed forms,
Pa
∗
= 12
√
λ2σ4(Gab+Gae)
2+4λGabGae(σ
2Gab−σ
2Gae−λσ4)
(λGabGae)
2
−σ2( 1
Gae
+ 1
Gab
) (69)
Pj
∗ = 12
√
λ2σ4(Gjb+Gje)
2+4λGjbGje(σ
2Gjb−σ
2Gje−λσ
4)
(λGjbGje)
2
−σ2( 1
Gje
+ 1
Gjb
) (70)
Notice that the solution set of this scenario is a special
case of the solution set of the previous scenario when the
cooperation level α = 1, as well as the constant λ = 1. In
fact, in a non-cooperative scenario, with per device total power
constraint, it can be easily shown through the Lagrangian and
the KKT conditions that the optimal strategy for each device
is to allocate their own total maximum power, i.e., (P ∗a , P ∗j ) =
(PA, PJ).
VIII. COOPERATIVE DISTANCE
Cooperation may be not beneficial for both parties, so no-
cooperation will be one response from one or both devices
if the cooperation will adversely affect its secrecy. Hence, it
follows the importance of the distance considerations between
cooperating parties. Thus, we will next consider the distance
between Alice and John so that cooperation beneficially exists;
otherwise John will adversely affect Alice.
Figure 2. System model illustrating fixed distances between the devices in
the wireless cloud
Consider the model in Figure 2. The distances between
different devices are considered such that dik is the distance
between transmitter i and receiver k. Then, using the relation
between the path loss exponent d−ηik which relates the loss of
the transmitted power over the distance of the transmission
path, we can induce the distance into the SNR in the defined
utilities. Consider η = 2 and the cooperative scenario-A
section VI, the optimal cooperative P ∗j is the solution of the
quadratic equation,
λα2GabGaePj
2 + λ(σ2αGabdab
2 + σ2αGaedae
2)Pj
−(σ2Gabdae2 − σ2Gaedab2 − λσ4dab2dae2) = 0 (71)
and the optimal cooperative Pa∗ is the solution of the
quadratic equation,
λGjeGjb
α2 Pa
2 + λ(
σ2Gjbdje
2
α +
σ2Gjedjb
2
α )Pa
−(σ2Gjbdjb2 − σ2Gjedje2 − λσ4djb2dje2) = 0 (72)
In fact, inducing the distances between Alice, Eve, and Bob,
or John, Eve, and Bob is not enough to make cooperation exit.
Therefore, we need to consider the distance between Alice
and John in the cooperation problem. Consider the effect of
Alice in John and vice versa as an interference effect, thus
the cooperative optimization problem in scenario-A, Section-
VI is such that the information rate from Alice to John and
vice versa will influence one another in a positive way, i.e., it
is used to cancel the rate decay (leakage) to Eve. So, in some
way or another, the optimization problem can be written as
follows,
Cs1αPj + log(1 + SNRja) (73)
Cs2Pa/α + log(1 + SNRaj) (74)
8From a power allocation perspective, this formulation means
that, log(1 + SNRja) would substitute for log(1 + SNRae)
and log(1 + SNRaj) would substitute for log(1 + SNRje)
as well, otherwise cooperation will not exist. Substitute the
distances into the conditions discussed we get the following,
αGaj
dab
2σ2 + αGajPj
≤
αGae
dae
2σ2 + αGaePj
(75)
and,
Gja
αdab
2σ2 +GjaPa
≤
Gje
αdje
2σ2 +GjePa
(76)
This leads to the condition that, if we need the cooperation
to be of benefit for one or both parties, then the following
distance constraints should exist. Similar analysis of the effect
of the distance between different devices in a wiretap setup
without cooperative scenarios has concluded that there is
a distance consideration for which the secrecy can exist,
otherwise not, and they call it secrecy coverage distance, [22].
Now for the setup of cooperative devices for the model in
Figure 2, the distance between Alice and Eve should be,
dae
η
≤
Gae
Gaj
daj
η (77)
and the distance between John and Eve should be,
dje
η
≤
Gje
Gja
daj
η (78)
If such distance consideration exists, then the cooperative
power allocation strategies are optimal in the sense of optimal
cooperation level.
Hence, Eve can try to break such distance constraints going
more near to one or both devices she wants to eavesdrop, i.e.,
moving the cooperation level into less cooperative and so the
achievable secure and reliable rates into lower bounds.
IX. ALGORITHM
We introduce a distributed algorithm that finds the optimal
power allocation set to secure the data transmission for the
model in Figure 1. First, the devices will check the distance
constraints to test if cooperation is of benefit. If yes, then
the devices will initiate the cooperation and will decides to
cooperate jointly, not to cooperate, or to cooperate from one
side. Therefore, the optimal power allocation for Alice and
John will follow the solution set of the scenarios discussed.
X. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We shall now present a set of illustrative results that cast
further insights to the problem. We choose a cooperation level
α = 0.8, channels gains are Gab = 0.4, Gae = 0.3, Gja =
0.2, Gjb = 0.5, and Gje = 0.3. We now analyze the set
of scenarios considered. Notice that we have chosen channel
gains for a non-degraded case, where the channels between
legitimate transmitters and the legitimate receiver are stronger
than those between legitimate transmitters and the illegitimate
receiver. Figure 3 illustrates the achievable secrecy rate for
Alice with respect to the main power Pa and the power Pjb
used to relay her. Figure 4 illustrates the achievable secrecy
rate for John with respect to the main power Pj and the power
Algorithm 1: Optimum Cooperative Power Allocation.
Alice→initiates cooperation mode.
Alice→requests relay service
Input : distance dab, dae, djb, dje, daj .
if αGaj
dab2σ2+αGajPj
≤ αGae
dae2σ2+αGaePj
and
Gja
αdab2σ2+GjaPa
≤ Gje
αdje2σ2+GjePa
and
dae
2 ≤ GaeGaj daj
2
and
dje
2 ≤ GjeGja daj
2 then
John→accepts to cooperate and decide cooperation with
level α and request Alice relay service.
if Alice accepts to cooperate; then
Output : 1 is executed.
else if John→rejects to relay data and devices go to
MAC cooperative mode; then
Output : 2 is executed.
else if John→accepts to cooperate from one side; then
Output : 3 is executed.
else if John→rejects to cooperate and devices go to
non-cooperative mode; then
Output : 4 is executed.
else
Output : 4 is executed.
Output: 1
The optimal cooperative relay power:
Pab
∗ solving equation (32)
Pjb
∗ solving equation (33)
Output: 2
The optimal cooperative main power:
Pa
∗ in (40)
Pj
∗ in (41)
Output: 3
The optimal cooperative / non-cooperative main power:
Pa
∗ in (54)
Pj
∗ in (55)
Output: 4
The optimal non-cooperative main power:
Pa
∗ in (69)
Pj
∗ in (70)
Devices keep checking distance constraint and adaptively
allocate their optimal power based on the cooperation
scenario selected.
Pab used to relay his data. As expected, the framework of
cooperation via relaying adds significantly to the achievable
9secure data rates of each device compared to the data rates
achieved without cooperation. The difference between the
gains in the data rates for Alice and John is due to the stronger
channel gain that John enjoys between his device and the
receiver device, Bob.
Figure 5 illustrates the achievable secrecy rates of Alice
with respect to her distance from Bob. The secrecy rates
has been simulated under different distances between Alice
and Eve dae and between John and Bob djb. As already
explained analytically in the previous sections, such distances
are associated to the SNRs obtained without and with relaying.
Therefore, it is of particular relevance to observe that the dis-
tance of the eavesdropper and the transmitter has fundamental
role in deciding whether the cooperation is of benefit or not.
This result shows that as long as the distances between the
legitimate transmitters and the legitimate receiver are smaller
than the distances between the legitimate transmitters and
the eavesdropper, the achievable secrecy gains are noticeable,
and as expected with relaying, the secrecy rates are higher.
Therefore, cooperative relaying is of benifit. However, its
interestingly shown that if John is too much far from Bob, the
gains expected from relaying are very limited, and at some
point going into no cooperation could be of more benefit
to the legitimate transmitter. Similar analysis applies to the
achievable secrecy rates of John with respect to his distance
from Bob.
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Figure 3. Secure data rates achievable by Alice (with and without relaying)
with respect to the main power Pa, (when no cooperation exists) and the relay
power Pjb (when Pa = PA is fixed and equals 5 and cooperative relaying
is active).
The results in Figure 6 to Figure 8 show the achievable
secrecy rate with respect to the optimized cooperative power
of the other device. Note that any set of optimum points
will lead to a point at which the achievable secrecy rate
is of maximum value. Note also that, it is clear that the
optimal power allocation in the scenario-VII will be to use the
maximum power so the achievable rates will be fixed for all
fixed instantaneous measures of the channels gains and thus we
didn’t include it here. In Figure 6 which considers cooperative
scenario-A with relaying, we can see the non-linear behavior
in terms of the optimal cooperative power. We can also see
that higher rates are achievable at the same cooperative powers
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Figure 4. Secure data rates achievable by John (with and without relaying)
with respect to the main power Pj , (when no cooperation exists) and the relay
power Pab (when Pj = PJ is fixed and equals 5 and cooperative relaying is
active).
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Figure 5. Secure data rates achievable by Alice, with and without relaying,
with respect to the distance between Alice and Bob (dab), and under different
distances (dae, djb between Alice and Eve and John and Bob, respectively.
in comparison to scenario-A in Figure 7 where relaying is not
implemented.
Therefore, with power cooperation and without data being
relayed, the achievable rates are supposed to be less. We can
also see at one chosen point of cooperative relaying power
for Alice and John; i.e., for a specific achievable rate of 20,
the corresponding cooperative power set (Pab, Pjb) is (8.32,
11.25) for Alice and John, respectively. We can choose any
other optimal set for scenario-A with relaying in Figure 6.
Similarly, for scenario-A in Figure 7 without relaying, we see
that at the cooperative power set (Pa, Pj) equals (7.76, 13)
the achievable secrecy rate is 10 via the same process. We
can also see that both Figure 6 and Figure 7 show the effect
on the secrecy rates when the distance conditions are met, we
can see that the cooperation is of benefit for both devices,
Alice and John, and their cooperation leads to maximizing
their achievable secrecy rates.
However, we can see in Figure 8, where the distance
condition is not met, thus cooperation will be of no benefit at
least for one of the devices, i.e., the achievable secrecy rate for
the device that doesn’t obey the distance constraints decreases
10
0 5 10 15 20
19
19.5
20
20.5
21
21.5
22
22.5
23
23.5
 
 
X: 8.32
Y: 20
Cooperative Power
A
ch
ie
va
bl
e 
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ra
te
−w
ith
 R
el
ay
in
g
X: 11.25
Y: 20
Cs1: Alice
Cs2: John
Figure 6. Achievable secrecy rates, with relaying and with distance
constraints met, versus the optimal cooperative power (Pab∗, Pjb∗).
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Figure 7. Achievable secrecy rates, without relaying and with distance
constraints met, versus the optimal cooperative power (Pa∗, Pj∗).
as the cooperation increases from the other device. Therefore,
as shown in Figure 8, the cooperation is adversely affecting
the secrecy rate for Alice; since the condition of the distance
between Eve and Alice compared to the distance between John
and Alice is not met, here we can easily pick up a point
where devices will chose that cooperation will not exist, that
is the point of intersection, which can also correspond to equal
cooperation from both sides, that is at α = 1.
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Figure 8. Achievable secrecy rates, without relaying and with distance
constraints not met, versus the optimal cooperative power (Pa∗, Pj∗).
XI. CONCLUSION
The main contribution of this paper is a classification
of the achievable secrecy rate regions for a model with
cooperative relaying at the two legitimate transmitters and
with no relaying where the model forms a MAC channel. A
derivation of different optimal cooperative power allocation
interpretations that aim to maximize the achievable secrecy
rates for the devices cooperating in a wireless medium have
been derived. We exploited the cooperation concept emulating
the wireless medium fading via the cooperative diversity
induced by relaying; that is known to add positively to the
achievable rates and consequently to the achievable secrecy
rates. We evaluated the cooperation schemes to the non-
cooperative ones in a distributed optimization formulation.
We propose a distributed algorithm to measure the optimal
power allocation. In particular, the optimal cooperative power
allocation in the different scenarios interestingly follows an
inverse waterfilling interpretation. We build upon distance
constraints that define when the cooperation will be of benefit
or not; i.e., the distance constraints will be the trigger for
the cooperative service request which leads to an optimal
power control in an adaptive sense, specifically if mobility
is considered and channel state information is shared between
the legitimate transmitting devices. This setup can contribute
to some clustering criteria in certain wireless setups, through
which such constraints are induced into the main optimal
cooperative power allocation. The paper sheds light on the
feasibility of cooperation in wireless clouds. The cooperation
concept seems so promising and appealing for next generation
wireless networks, however, to secure data transmission such
device to device cooperation should be associated with adap-
tive and distributed algorithms that constraint the global cloud
cooperation when cooperating devices will cause interference
and so jam the main transmission or when possible common
or active eavesdroppers exist. From a security perspective,
there is should be a framework for cooperation that can be
customizable to the application.
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